November 13, 2006
Looking (In
Vain) for Remittance Benefits
Remittances are once again a hot topic among
economists. The
2006 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to economists who
developed
"micro finance" banking, a scheme which (
allegedly)
enables small amounts of cash remittances to be
leveraged into larger private sector loans.
More recently, a World Bank study
credited remittances with
reducing poverty, increasing
entrepreneurship, and even raising children’s
educational achievement.
But the euphoria of past years is
gone:
"On the whole, the overall
conclusion….is that remittances are an engine for
development, but they are neither ‘manna from heaven’
nor
a substitute for sound development policies. First,
the
migration flows that logically precede surges in
remittances are not without costs, both for
the households directly affected and
their countries. For instance, once reductions in
households’ earnings-generating potential are taken into
account, net income increases fall well below observed
remittance inflows—simply because the migrant was
usually economically active. As a result, the potential
poverty and inequality reduction of remittances is, in
most cases, quite modest." [Pablo Fajnzylber, "Close
to Home: The Development Impact of Remittances in Latin
America," World Bank, October 2006.
PDF. See also account in Bob Davis,
Migrants’ Money Is Imperfect Cure For Poor Nations,
Wall Street Journal, November 1, 2006,
free reprint here.]
In fact, few of the reputed
benefits hold up:
Claim:
Remittances flow directly to needy recipients, unlike
foreign aid which flows through corrupt government
agencies.
Fact: Mexico
will receive $23 billion in "Workers Remittances"
this year, a whopping four-fold jump since 2000. [Table
1] But the
Bank of Mexico classifies
any transaction from an individual with an Hispanic
name in the U.S. to an individual with an Hispanic name
in Mexico as a remittance. [See Migration, the
diaspora and development: The case of Mexico, By
Agustín Escobar and Latapí Eric Janssen (
PDF)
p. 14]
Much of this inflow represents
business transactions among individuals and transfers
among
wealthy people. Still more comes from money
laundering by
drug traffickers and
other criminals. As evidence: the Banks’ own
statistics show that poor states with very low
emigration rates receive disproportionately large shares
of remittance inflows.
Bottom line: Remittance growth as
reported by the Bank of Mexico is 3 to 5 times greater
than the estimates of pro-immigration groups, like Pew,
that survey legal and illegal Mexican immigrants in the
U.S. As an author of one such study says: "If Mexican
households were receiving that much money, we would be
overcoming our problems more quickly." [Official
statistics on money sent to Mexico too high, study says,
By Brendan M. Case, Dallas Morning News, (
pay
archive) June 17, 2005.]
Claim:
Remittances increase investment.
Fact:
Although most remittances are wired to Mexican banks,
the recipients are generally not bank customers, and
very little of the money is deposited. Mexicans
simply do not trust banks. They withdraw the funds
as if from a corner grocery store.
And this behavior is impervious to
economic incentives. In 2003, for example, the Federal
Reserve and the Bank of Mexico launched a system
offering low-cost transfers to recipients who opened
bank accounts. Only a few thousand of the millions of
remittance recipients took them up on it. [
Money
Transfers Mounting U.S. Encourages Cash Flow Across
Border As Tool To Deter Illegal Immigration, By
Binyamin Appelbaum, Rick Rothacker And Franco Ordoñez,
Charlotte Observer, Aug. 27, 2006]
Bottom line:
90 percent of the money remitted to Mexico is used
for food, rent, health care, and other forms of
consumption.
Claim:
Remittances reduce
Mexico’s unemployment rate
Fact:
This is true—but not for the reasons you might think.
Higher remittance income appears to induce males to
leave the formal labor force for the informal—or
underground—labor force.
The change is dramatic:
"A 100
peso increase in remittances (about 16 percent of the
average monthly remittance amount) is associated with a
32hours/month or 15 percent reduction in formal sector
work by men in urban and rural areas, and with an 11
hours/month (5 percent) reduction male self-employment
in urban areas. Yet, the same remittance increment is
tied to a 30 hours/month (14 percent) and to 28
hours/month (13 percent) increase in informal sector
work in urbanized and rural areas, respectively."
[Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes and Susan Pozo, “Migration,
Remittances and male and Female Employment Patterns",
American Economic Association, 2006.
PDF]
Among possible explanations from
the same paper:
"In
particular, the higher incidence of informal sector
employment among men experiencing an increase in
remittance income may be linked to the disruptive impact
of household migration, which induces these
non-migrating men to work. If these men experience
barriers to formal sector work or urban self-employment,
they may turn to ‘just-in-time’ or informal jobs to
compensate for lost household income and to /or to
defray household migration-related expenditures (e.g.,
coyote payments)."
Upon exiting the formal labor
force, unemployed remittance recipients workers are no
longer counted as unemployed. This helps explain why
Mexico’s "Formal sector unemployment rate" has
remained in an absurdly low 2 percent to 3 percent range
for a decade. [International Monetary Fund, Mexico,
Country Report, October 2006.
Table 1. (
PDF)]
Claim:
Remittances are also good for the U.S. economy.
Fact:
In the U.S. national income accounts remittances are
counted as an export of capital, and therefore a
reduction to GDP.
It is often claimed, however, that
this reduction ultimately will be more than offset by
increased exports to a stronger Mexico. But so far
there’s no sign of this. (See
Table 1.)
Between 2000 and 2005 remittances
increased by 205 percent while exports to Mexico rose by
just 8 percent. Over that same period the U.S. trade
deficit with Mexico more than doubled.
Not for the first time, the
much-touted benefits of America’s immigration
disaster turn out to be
spurious—even
for Mexico.
Edwin S. Rubenstein (email
him) is President of
ESR Research Economic Consultants in Indianapolis.