Alien Nation Review: NR, May 1995
- Fukuyama
National
Review, May 1, 1995 v47 n8 p77(2) Francis Fukuyama
Culture Vulture
Alien
Nation: Common Sense About America's Immigration
Disaster.
Francis Fukuyama.
© National Review Inc. 1995
Mr. Fukuyama, a senior researcher
at the RAND Corporation in Washington, D.C., has just
completed a book on social capital and the global
economy, which will be published this summer by Free
Press. The views expressed here are his own.
PETER Brimelow deserves praise
for going to the heart of the immigration issue, which
is not about economics but about the nature of
American nationality. There is a tendency among
proponents of immigration to argue that America,
unlike most other nations in the world, is built
around a set of universalistic liberal ideas, and that
it has no national identity beyond the Constitution
and the system of law based on it. Brimelow argues,
quite rightly, that no nation can be built in so
abstract a manner. And the United States has not been
the exception to this rule: it has always been a
community with a common culture set by its dominant
elites.
So far so good. But the question
then becomes, What is the precise nature of that
national identity and common culture? Here, it is
possible to be much more precise than Mr. Brimelow.
American culture comes from the Puritan sectarian
religious heritage of the early Anglo-Saxon settlers,
together with the Lockean-liberal ideology they had
adopted by the eighteenth century. This alone explains
America's work ethic (traditionally and today much
higher than that of England), its entrepreneurial and
innovative character, its prudery and moralism, the
high level of trust in its society, and in particular
the strange and fortuitous coexistence of
individualism and a powerful propensity for community
(Tocqueville's famous art of association''). Brimelow,
however, picks a strange definition of what he means
by America as a national community. At times he edges
toward defining it as a Christian'' country, but backs
away (perhaps because this would exclude his Jewish
neo-conservative friends and include all those Mexican
illegal aliens). In the end, he explains the content
of American'' national identity in old-fashioned,
blood- and-soil racial terms: it is the culture of
white (i.e., European- origin) Americans.
But who are white'' Americans?
The U.S. is the only country in the world that thinks
there is a cultural group called whites.'' In Europe
there are only Germans, Italians, Poles, Magyars,
Croats, and the like. (There are also some limp-wristed
Europeans,'' but I'm sure Mr. Brimelow doesn't take
them seriously.) The strange category of white''
exists in the U.S. only because the original
Protestant Anglo-Saxon settlers of the country took
in, successively, other Protestants from Central and
Northern Europe, then a large group of Catholic Irish,
and then, in the great immigration wave at the turn of
the century, an extremely large group of Catholic and
Jewish immigrants from southern Italy, the
Austro-Hungarian Empire, Russia, and elsewhere. Though
this is not always apparent today, the degree of
cultural and perceived racial distance between these
groups was every bit as great at the time they arrived
here as the distance between the median'' Anglo of
today (named Pezzuli or Steinberg) and a recent
Mexican immigrant. Hence, the common American culture
that both Mr. Brimelow and I find so important is
actually a sectarian Protestant Anglo-Saxon culture
that was somehow detached from its ethnic roots, mixed
with universalistic Lockean-liberal principles, and
adopted by the non-Anglo-Saxon, non-Protestant
immigrants from Europe who arrived subsequently, and
who then intermarried to such an extent that it is no
longer meaningful to try to determine what proportion
of the country is descended from Italians, Swedes, and
the like. And the rate of intermarriage between
natives and recent non-European immigrants is so high
that it makes as little sense to worry about the U.S.
becoming a majority non-white'' country by the middle
of the next century as it did to worry about it
becoming majority non-Anglo-Saxon'' in the last. Yet
Brimelow for some reason insists on describing in
racial and ethnic terms a national identity that can
only be properly characterized in cultural terms.
He does somewhat of the same
thing when describing the post-1965 immigration as
predominantly coming from the Third World.'' The Third
World is a very big place, and, as it turns out, this
immigration wave decomposes overwhelmingly into two
significant groups: Latinos and Asians. Brimelow is
very cagey about the Asians: while admitting that many
Americans seem'' to think Asians have the right
cultural values, he is not so sure and will reserve
judgment. The fact is that there is a mountain of
empirical evidence indicating not just that Asians may
have the right Puritan, Anglo-Saxon'' virtues, but
that they have them to a significantly higher degree
than people actually of Protestant Anglo-Saxon descent
(many of whom are today either ultra-liberals pushing
the multiculturalist agenda, or else poorly educated,
low- income workers in the rural South, whose families
are fraying and whose politics are increasingly up for
grabs as a result of their downward social mobility).
Missing from Alien
Nation is any acknowledgment of the positive
characteristics of immigrants, which in virtually all
countries give them a higher level of drive and
ambition than the natives. One consequence is that
immigration has become critical to America's global
technological leadership. Far too few well- educated,
native white Americans today want to become engineers,
as opposed to lawyers, investment bankers, or
journalists, and immigration has played a key role in
bridging this labor gap for a couple of generations
now. This impact may not be evident to people in
non-technical fields, but it is borne out by the
statistics: a third of the engineers in Silicon Valley
are foreign-born, including some 12,000 ethnic
Chinese. Brimelow argues that even if immigrants were
responsible for the entire computer industry, this
would only'' account for $120 billion of the American
GDP -- as if $120 billion a year were chump change,
and as if the only significance of the high-tech
sector to the U.S. economy were the direct earnings of
its firms.
Far more important than
economics, however, is culture. Brimelow legitimately
worries that the "browning'' of America will lead
to a loss of its culture and national identity. The
rhetoric of the multiculturalists he cites is truly
frightening: their hope is that the changing racial
composition of America will in fact lead to its
"Third Worldization.'' In taking this threat
seriously, however, Brimelow makes the mistake of
assuming that racial, cultural, and political
boundaries will all coincide. That is, he assumes that
all non-European minorities will support
multiculturalist policies, and vote Democratic to
boot, while whites as a group will support traditional
values and resist this trend. Mr. Brimelow seems not
to have noticed that multiculturalism would never have
gotten anywhere but for the support of countless white
school board members, schoolteachers and university
professors. In fact, the two most powerful groups
actively promoting the Balkanization of traditional
American culture today have been feminists and gays,
groups that are almost entirely controlled by
middle-class whites. The one way that the Republican
Party could lose its emerging majority-party status is
by defining itself as white and anti-immigrant,
thereby turning its back on middle-class Hispanics and
Asians. Brimelow's own book notes that Asians voted
for George Bush in 1992 in proportions exceeded only
by evangelical Christians.
Brimelow's fundamental mistake,
it seems to me, is his assumption that non-European
immigrants will end up like African- Americans -- hard
to assimilate and therefore angry, resentful, and
demanding of special entitlements and set-asides. The
truth of the matter, however, is that of America's
different racial and ethnic minorities, blacks are the
only group that has not assimilated successfully. All
the others will succeed much like the Irish and
Italians before them, provided they do not follow the
post - civil-rights pattern of seeking socio-economic
advancement primarily through political and legal
action.
When it comes to concrete policy
recommendations, I actually find myself in agreement
with many of Brimelow's suggestions. It is certainly
possible to reform and streamline the Immigration and
Naturalization Service; we can do a much better job of
patrolling our borders; the 1965 Immigration Act can
be amended to de- emphasize family reunification and
to emphasize skills; welfare and other benefits to
immigrants ought to be scaled back, not out of
mean-spiritedness, but for the immigrants' own sake.
The most important battle, however, is not over
immigration per se, but over the preservation of a
common American culture. This means rolling back
multiculturalism, bilingualism, race-based
preferences, and all the other divisive public-policy
innovations of recent decades. For none of the
problems of cultural incoherence that Brimelow cites
would go away, or even diminish significantly, if all
immigration, legal and illegal, ended tomorrow.