Give Me Your Fanatics, Your
Mass Murderers
By S. T. Karnick
Within a day after last
Tuesday's attacks on the World Trade Center and
prominent government targets, federal authorities had
already identified almost all the direct perpetrators
and numerous accomplices in several cities who had
helped in planning and execution. Hundreds of FBI
agents accumulated information "on those who stood
out: who they were, where they stayed, who they
called, who sponsored them, what phone calls they
made,"
said a former head of the agency's New York
office.( LA Times, September 13,
Investigators Identify 50 Terrorists Tied to Plot)
Agents called the families of all those on the
passenger lists and looked at bank, credit card, and
telephone records of those who could not be vouched
for, also checking immigration records of any
noncitizens.
The results of the investigation
are impressive. But the damage was already done, and it
is important to know why such information was not
collected in time to prevent the Black Tuesday atrocity.
Federal agencies had long known of the American
terrorist cells associated with Osama bin Laden, such as
the one in Boston. But they did nothing to break them up
and deport the conspirators, as any sensible people
would, or even to monitor them effectively enough to
prevent the Tuesday massacre.
Federal officials have reported
that the hijackers were supported by confederates in
Newark, Boston, and Virginia, who provided money, rental
cars, credit cards, lodging, and other such aid. As many
as fifty people, perhaps more, were directly involved in
this plot, yet not one of them was under sufficient
surveillance to cause officials to figure out that
something might be up. Such negligence boggles the mind.
As reported in the New York
Times, "government officials disclosed that at least
two people believed to be associates of Mr. bin Laden,
and who may have been involved in the attack, entered
the United States recently, slipping into the country
before the Immigration and Naturalization Service was
told to prevent their entry."(NYT,
September 13, 2001,
Thursday, AFTER THE ATTACKS: THE INVESTIGATION; BIN
LADEN TIE CITED [Pay
archive.]) A senior federal official said that
American intelligence organizations had recently told
the INS to place on a watch list several people believed
to be linked to bin Laden, to prevent them from entering
the United States. "There was intelligence that these
guys were potential problems," the official said.
Immigration officers, however, told them that two of
them were already in the United States, and the FBI
subsequently failed to find them. The government source
said that they may have been involved in the attacks.
The hijack teams included pilots
trained in the United States, at least two of whom
received
training at a commercial flight school in Florida.
These latter entered the country legally, as far as is
now known, but they surely had direct or at least
secondhand contact with people whom the authorities
should have been keeping under close surveillance. The
president of the Florida flight school that may have
trained two of the hijackers turned over their files and
copies of the students' passports the day after the
attack, but the FBI does not seem to have seen fit to
collect such information routinely. Had they done so,
and had they accumulated similar data about other
noncitizens living in the United States, their computers
might easily have found that some of these people were
associated with associates of the bin Laden group.
In fact, federal authorities had
already known for some time that there were very active
terrorist cells, including some associated with bin
Laden, operating on U.S. soil. Jordanian authorities
accused two immigrant Boston cab drivers,
Bassam A. Kanj and Raed Hijazi, of plotting
terrorist attacks on American and Israeli tourists in
Jordan during that country's millennium celebrations.
Hijazi, suspected leader of the millennium plot, is now
in Jordan under sentence of death, and Kanj died leading
an attack in Lebanon. Hijazi lived in Boston until late
1998, and Kanj lived in that same city for seventeen
years.
Think of it: international
terrorists and groups of people who have declared a holy
war against the United States have been operating freely
on our nation's soil for many years. Federal
investigative agencies knew about this but did not
manage to deport these people, and the American public
knew little or nothing about these dangerous fanatics in
our midst.
There is, moreover, no legal
impediment to monitoring these people.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act even
authorizes electronic surveillance of people whom the
authorities have probable cause to believe are agents of
a foreign powers. And we certainly have sufficient
personnel to dedicate to this all-important work, as the
instant success of the past two days' investigations and
the enormity of the atrocity both show.
Many, if not most, public
officials and journalists tend to view the Immigration
and Nationalization Service (INS) not as a gatekeeper
but as an immigrant-recruiting organization.
Commentators have recently pointed out that the INS is
not a police service, and there are good reasons for not
making it into one. (The strongest being that we already
have enough federal police.) But the ease with which the
Black Tuesday terrorists entered the country and moved
about in learning the skills with which to destroy huge
buildings and kill thousands of people surely call for a
rethinking of the duties of the INS. Preventing
potential terrorists from such free access to American
soil and technologies will require, at a minimum,
logical admission-preference standards for immigrants to
the United States. Clearly, the current standards should
be scrapped and replaced with ones that emphasize job
skills, English-language proficiency, and cultural
compatibility, and the INS should be assigned the task
of keeping close watch over exactly what our noncitizen
guests are up to while they reside on American soil.
That is a job that only Congress can do, and it had
better act soon, before more atrocities transpire.
Enforcing those standards would be
the job of a rejuvenated INS, and it will be important
for both Congress and the INS to make sure that the
burdens fall where they historically did before
1965-upon the prospective immigrants rather than on
current citizens. Proposals for a national I.D. card,
greater harassment of U.S. citizens traveling across the
border, and the like fail that test completely and
should be rejected. Those who wish to benefit from
long-term access to America should be happy to pay the
price of admission, and current citizens should be
expected to benefit from their presence, not be burdened
by it. Establishing such an approach, however, will
require a greater respect for the distinction between
citizenship and noncitizen status.
The only thing standing in the
way, it seems, is the nation's regnant multiculturalist
philosophy, which discourages us from treating
noncitizens differently from citizens. The courts,
Congress, and presidential administrations have
increasingly treated foreign nationals on U.S. soil as
if they had
all the civil rights of American citizens. But they
certainly do not. Human rights, yes, but civil rights,
no.
Of course, nearly all noncitizens
living in the United States are perfectly law-abiding
people who want only to succeed like their neighbors,
and we should welcome them and admire them for their
pluck and determination. Nonetheless, until they are
willing to take the step of renouncing citizenship with
their birth countries and assume American citizenship,
they cannot and must not be accorded all the rights of
full American citizens. If, as seems all but certain,
the Black Tuesday atrocity was perpetrated by foreigners
with the aid and comfort of noncitizen allies entrenched
on U.S. soil, our understanding of the rights of
noncitizens in the United States must change
significantly, and right away. We should surely be
cautious, humane, and sensitive in our monitoring of our
noncitizen guests. But our first priority must be the
safety of the American people.
In light of Tuesday's attack, any
thought of opening our borders further, as has been
discussed recently, should be put on indefinite hold -
if not scuttled altogether on principle. Greater
surveillance of both foreign and domestic radical groups
will be an essential part of any long-term solution.
Recognizing the huge difference between the rights of
American citizens and those of foreigners on our soil is
a long-overdue, utterly necessary first step.
S. T. Karnick is Editor in Chief,
American Outlook and Director of Publications
for the
Hudson Institute.
September 25, 2001