November 05, 2003
Department of Justice, Office of
Inspector General report on “Citizenship USA” –
Excerpts on agricultural amnesty
fraud
[See
Ask An Amnesty Advocate: How Much Fraud Last Time? by Juan Mann,
November 5, 2003]
Report of investigation
by the Department of Justice Office of
the Inspector General (OIG) examining the Immigration
and Naturalization Service's (INS) "Citizenship USA" (CUSA)
initiative of fiscal year 1996. Excerpts
addressing the problem of widespread fraud in the
Special Agricultural Worker (SAW) amnesty program under
the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA).
(Report dated July 31, 2000)
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Section III (D)(4)(a)(1) – Special Agricultural
Workers become eligible to apply for naturalization
Congressional passage of IRCA permitted
millions of undocumented aliens to obtain lawful
permanent resident status through INS' resulting
Legalization or "Amnesty" program. [Immigration and
Naturalization Service] Commissioner [Doris] Meissner
advised Congress in September 1995 that "a major reason"
for the increase in naturalization application filings
that INS had experienced was this Legalization program.
IRCA contained two "amnesty"
provisions. The first dealt primarily with undocumented
aliens who had entered the United States before January
1, 1982, without inspection or on a visitor or student
visa and overstayed or worked without permission. These
"pre-1982 applicants" had to meet certain requirements
concerning proof of identity, length of residence, and
financial responsibility in order to obtain permanent
resident status. IRCA's other legalization provision,
and the one examined by the OIG, afforded permanent
residence to certain undocumented agricultural workers
known as "Special Agricultural Workers," who had
engaged in agricultural work for specified periods of
time between May 1, 1984, and May 1, 1986.
Successful SAW applicants obtained
temporary residency. They generally adjusted to lawful
permanent residents within one or two years (depending
on whether they were "group 1" or "group 2" applicants
and depending on the date of which their applications
were granted). The deadline for applying for residency
under the SAW provisions was November 30, 1988. This
meant that many hundreds of thousands of persons who had
obtained lawful permanent resident status through the
SAW program became eligible for naturalization in 1994
and 1995 (i.e., five years after becoming permanent
residents). According to INS documents, as of December
1, 1995, this group of potential citizens numbered
approximately 1.2 million persons.
Section III (D)(4)(a)(2) – INS' belief in widespread
fraud in SAW program
To be eligible for adjustment of status
under the SAW provisions, the applicant had to prove
with documentation that he or she had worked in an
agricultural enterprise in the United States for 90 days
in each calendar year from 1984 through 1986, or for 90
days between May 1985 and May 1986. The evidence of
having engaged in such work, INS employees believed, was
often forged and sold to undocumented individuals
seeking U.S. residency. Given the crush of
applications under the program and the relative fewer
investigative resources, INS approved applications
absent explicit proof that they were in fact fraudulent.
We found that there was consensus
within INS that "SAW fraud"—or fraud in adjusting status
under the SAW provisions of IRCA—had been prevalent. As
Commissioner Meissner told the OIG, the perception
that the SAW program was rife with fraud was "the
commonly held view at the institution." Although
some Headquarters officials told the OIG that no
empirical studies formally established the extent of
such fraud, they acknowledged that the Field believed it
had been widespread.139
Footnote 139.
According to an e-mail message summarizing the topics of
discussion, Headquarters officials meeting on December
1, 1995, noted that 1.2 million SAW applicants had
become eligible for naturalization that day, "with
70% fraudulent applications anticipated [sic]."
Although the extent of fraud in the SAW program was not
documented, by September 1995 INS had conducted at least
one large-scale investigation into organized efforts to
sell fraudulent SAW documents. In addition to
identifying suspects who were later convicted of federal
crimes, that operation identified approximately 22,000
adjustment of status cases that were connected in some
way to the persons convicted (for example, a case was
included among the 22,000 if the certificate from an
agricultural entity bore the signature of one of the
suspects). For a more complete discussion of INS'
actions in relation to these 22,000 cases, see
"Operation Desert Deception," below.
Section III (D)(4)(a)(3) – Congressional concern
about SAW fraud and INS' commitment to take appropriate
action
INS officials were not alone in
thinking that the SAW program was rife with fraud. On
June 28, 1995, Barbara Jordan, chair of the U.S.
Commission on Immigration Reform, testified before a
joint hearing of House and Senate immigration
subcommittees about the Commission's recommendations.140
According to Jordan's prepared statement, the Commission
urged INS, in light of "reports of widespread fraud" in
the SAW program, to pay "special attention" to the
naturalization applications of those who became legal
residents under the SAW provisions. The Commission
recommended that INS "carefully scrutinize the
naturalization applications of all special agricultural
workers to ensure that their special agricultural worker
status was properly granted."
Senate Immigration Subcommittee
Chairman
Alan Simpson asked INS to respond to several
questions after a September 1995 hearing, one of which
directly addressed SAW fraud. After first indicating
that he had information that "experts claim[ed] that
50% of the SAW applications were fraudulent,"
Chairman Simpson asked how INS intended to address the
issue of fraud when SAW beneficiaries applied for
naturalization.
[INS Executive Associate Commissioner]
EAC [T. Alexander] Aleinikoff and Rosenberg met with
Chairman Simpson's staff in October 1995, several weeks
after the September hearing, to discuss the Chairman's
concerns. According to Rosenberg, participants at the
meeting discussed SAW fraud and INS' intended response
"extensively." Rosenberg told the OIG that his position
at the meeting was that INS should not single out all
SAW applicants for treatment different than that
received by other naturalization applicants. According
to documents prepared for the meeting, INS' position was
that SAW applicants would be treated like other
applicants, and that indication of fraud would be
investigated. When fraud was substantiated the applicant
would not be naturalized.
Footnote 140.
Jordan testified before the Subcommittee on Immigration
of the Senate Judiciary Committee and the Subcommittee
on Immigration and Claims of the House Judiciary
Committee.
Section III (D)(4)(a)(4)—The role of immigration
fraud in the naturalization adjudication
Even without the additional exhortation
from Congress, as implied by INS' response to Chairman
Simpson, federal law required INS to be vigilant about
previous immigration fraud when adjudicating any
application for naturalization. One of the prerequisites
to naturalization was that the applicant, as set forth
in the INA at 8 USC § 1429, had been "lawfully admitted
to the United States for permanent residence in
accordance with all applicable provisions of [the INA]."
The INA directed the Attorney General to rescind the
lawful permanent resident status of any person later
found to have been ineligible. The applicant was asked
on the N-400 whether he or she had ever "given false
testimony for the purpose of obtaining any immigration
benefit," a question that would encompass, among other
things, false statements the applicant made to adjust
status. Finally, obtaining permanent resident status
through fraud clearly should affect an adjudicator's
evaluation of the applicant's "good moral character,"
and, as noted above in INS' response to Chairman
Simpson's follow-up questions, would have resulted in
denial of the application for naturalization.141
Therefore, merely by enforcing the existing rules and
regulations, INS could have been watchful for SAW fraud
without running the risk of treating such applicants
differently from any other applicant for naturalization.
To effectively enforce this aspect of
the naturalization laws, the adjudicator needed to be
aware of the various methods by which a person could
become a permanent resident. As previously noted in this
chapter, change of status issues were not covered in the
abbreviated training offered to new CUSA adjudicators.
Consequently, this omission necessarily limited
officers' ability to detect SAW fraud (or any other kind
of previous immigration irregularity). This lack of
training, coupled with the fact that an applicant's
permanent file was often unavailable at interview (as
discussed in a subsequent chapter), hobbled officers'
efforts to thoroughly enforce the naturalization laws.
In addition to these deficiencies, INS Headquarters
provided no guidance to adjudicators during CUSA
concerning how to detect SAW fraud or what to do upon
its discovery.
Such guidance was sorely needed because
of confusion in the Field about whether the
naturalization adjudicator was permitted to review
information in an applicant's file relating to his or
her application for adjustment of status under IRCA's
"amnesty" provisions. The confusion stemmed from an
over-expansive interpretation of the rules governing the
confidentiality of those applications for adjustment of
status under IRCA. We offer a brief description of the
confidentiality provisions of IRCA as background to this
discussion.
Footnote 141.
Several provisions of law support denial of
naturalization to someone found to have obtained
residency by fraud. The applicant necessarily lacked the
requisite "good moral character" if the original fraud
was false testimony made under oath in order to receive
an immigration benefit and occurred within five years of
the date on which the applicant applied for
naturalization. If fraud was established but the
applicant denied the conduct at the naturalization
interview, then the false testimony to the adjudicator
could be grounds for denial. Furthermore, if the fraud
occurred outside the 5-year "good moral character"
period, it could nevertheless be taken into account in
evaluating the application if "relevant" or if the
applicant's subsequent conduct did not reflect that
there had been "a reform of character."
Section III (D)(4)(a)(5)— The confidentiality
provisions of IRCA
To encourage potentially eligible
applicants to apply for adjustment of status, IRCA
established that information provided by amnesty
applicants would not be used to deport them (on the
basis of having illegally entered the country or having
overstayed after entering legally) in the event that
their applications were denied. The confidentiality
provisions of IRCA prohibited INS from using the
information in a legalization file "for any purpose
other than to make a determination on the application or
for enforcement of [the provisions concerning false
statements in applying for adjustment of status], or for
the preparation of reports to Congress" as required by
IRCA. As a means of facilitating compliance with this
provision, INS segregated information pertaining to the
legalization application from other information in the
applicant's file and placed a red cover or "red sheet"
on top of the information.
IRCA's implementing regulations did not
address whether the information in a granted
legalization application could subsequently be used for
any purpose, such as to determine eligibility for
another immigration benefit. In July 1989, INS amended
its regulations and specifically addressed subsequent
uses of the information in a granted legalization
application. At least two regulations spelled out the
propriety of reviewing the adjustment application. The
regulations concerning the application for temporary
residence (the first stage of the amnesty adjustment of
status process) provided that "information in a granted
legalization application and contained in the
applicant's file" was "subject to subsequent review in
reference to future benefits applied for (including
petitions for naturalization and permanent resident
status for relatives)." In the regulations concerning
the temporary resident's adjustment to permanent
resident (the second stage), it was noted that
"information contained in granted legalization files may
be used by the Service at a later date to make a
decision … on an immigrant visa petition or other status
filed by the applicant . . ." or "on a naturalization
application submitted by the applicant," and for the
preparation of reports to Congress and for the
furnishing of information for the census.
Section III (D)(4)(c)—Operation
Desert Deception: INS did not take action during CUSA to
prevent applicants who had benefited from SAW fraud from
becoming citizens
By September 1995, INS had specifically
identified 22,000 cases of suspected SAW fraud in the
aftermath of an extensive criminal investigation
entitled "Operation Desert Deception." These 22,000
cases were connected to several defendants in the
investigation who had by then been convicted of various
federal crimes relating to an elaborate SAW fraud
scheme. Despite knowledge of these cases at the highest
level of INS, despite knowledge that many of these
individuals had become or would soon become eligible to
apply for naturalization, and despite Headquarters'
commitment to Congress in November 1995 that it would
appropriately investigate cases in which SAW fraud was
suspected, INS did not take timely action to ensure that
applicants suspected of SAW fraud did not naturalize
during CUSA. The evidence shows that INS knowingly put
CUSA's production priorities ahead of its commitment to
take appropriate action to prevent individuals who had
already fraudulently received one immigration benefit
from becoming U.S. citizens.
Section III (D)(4)(c)(1) —Background
on Operation Desert Deception
In 1995, INS' Investigations Division
completed a 5-year criminal investigation into
immigration fraud code-named "Operation Desert
Deception" (ODD). The investigation, conducted largely
around Las Vegas, Nevada, focused on individuals who
assisted aliens in preparing and filing fraudulent
legalization applications and other documents with INS.
This investigation resulted in the successful
prosecution of 54 individuals, including two INS
officers, for legalization fraud, bribery, and tax
evasion.
During the course of the investigation,
approximately 22,000 A-files were segregated as possibly
fraudulent because they contained residency applications
that had been filed in Las Vegas during the time period
under investigation. Primarily as a function of the date
on which the residency applications were filed, the
22,000 cases included persons who were then eligible to
naturalize (because five years had passed since the time
that permanent residency had been granted), as well as
other persons who were not yet eligible to naturalize.
These A-files were stored in an INS facility in Las
Vegas until sentencing and post-trial motions were
completed on the 54 defendants in the spring of 1996.
The 22,000 cases were of interest to
the ODD prosecution team not just because they contained
evidence of the defendants' criminal conduct, but also
because the applicants themselves—though not the primary
targets of the investigation—included persons who
knowingly participated in the defendants' criminal
scheme. Although prosecutors decided that the task was
too great to consider pursuing criminal charges against
individual applicants, EAC Aleinikoff, in a declaration
signed on September 13, 1995, and later filed with the
federal court in Nevada in support of INS' request for
restitution from one prominent defendant in the case,
told the court that INS was going to begin a costly
review of the 22,000 files
…in an effort to identify any fraudulent documents or
false applications submitted by an individual applicant
to obtain immigration benefits under the Immigration
Reform and Control Act (IRCA). To the extent permitted
by law, based upon that review, the INS will then take
action to divest any alien of any benefit fraudulently
obtained through the legalization process.
Thus, the files were also kept
segregated in Las Vegas in anticipation of this INS
review.153
Footnote 153.
For those cases among the 22,000 in
which permanent residency had been granted more than
five years earlier and for which reviewers determined
the application for residency had been fraudulent, the
review promised by Aleinikoff, if timely, would
presumably prevent INS from inadvertently approving an
application for naturalization by that permanent
resident.
Section III (D)(4)(c)(2) —The
delay
Despite Aleinikoff's representations,
and despite INS' representations to Congress later in
1995 that it would take steps to ensure that cases in
which SAW fraud was suspected would be investigated
before any decision was made to approve naturalization,
INS did not timely undertake the promised review of the
22,000 cases. The lead federal prosecutor working on the
criminal cases told the OIG that he became concerned
when, despite his requests in October 1995, INS had not
taken any steps toward reviewing the cases by late 1995.
The prosecutor said that each day more of the
legalization applicants were becoming eligible, and he
believed that INS was bound by Aleinikoff's declaration
to conduct a thorough review. The prosecutor told the
OIG that he recalled discussions with INS officials in
late 1995 during which INS balked at conducting the case
review because of budget concerns.
By May 1996, INS still had not begun to
review the files. During a conference call with INS
officials on May 14, 1996, the prosecutor was advised
that the reason for delays in implementing the review
was budgetary concerns, specifically that INS' resources
were primarily devoted to CUSA. As he indicated in his
contemporaneous notes, INS told him that the "big
priority is naturalization, to naturalize 1.6 million
people." Michael Niefach of the General Counsel's
Office, who also participated in the conference call,
corroborated the prosecutor's recollection that he had
expressed his concern about the delay and had asked INS
to undertake the promised review. Niefach told the OIG
that budget constraints, although not specifically the
CUSA program, had prevented INS from undertaking the
review project before that date.154
Footnote 154.
Niefach told the OIG that he was unaware of the CUSA
program at that time.
Section III (D)(4)(c)(3)—144 naturalized before INS'
file review begins
Finally, however, as a result of the
prosecutor's concerns and because of unfavorable media
attention INS was receiving in Las Vegas about the
delay, INS assembled a team to review the Operation
Desert Deception cases beginning on May 28, 1996. By
June 14, 1996, the team had reviewed, sorted, and
categorized all 21,062 files. They found that 5,840 of
the A-files belonged to individuals who had been lawful
permanent residents for more than five years and thus
could apply to naturalize at any time. In addition, they
found that 144 of the A-files belonged to individuals
who had already naturalized (the fact that these
applicants had naturalized even though their A-files
were stored in Las Vegas reflected INS' liberal use of
temporary files during CUSA, as discussed in the
subsequent chapter on A-files155).
Individuals in 1,680 other cases had not been permanent
residents for five years, and, consequently, rescission
of resident status remained possible. An additional
1,203 of the timely filed adjustment of status
applications were "pending," meaning they were in some
stage of adjudication. The remaining 12,195 cases were
considered untimely filed adjustment of status
applications.
INS sent the files to the California
Service Center after this review where the team proposed
to take administrative action on all inappropriately
granted applications, such as revocation of
naturalization and rescission of lawful permanent
resident status. The cases accorded the highest priority
among those needing additional review were the 5,840
cases in which the applicant was eligible to naturalize.
These files needed to be reviewed quickly to determine
whether they revealed sufficient evidence of fraud so
that they could be denied for naturalization due to lack
of "good moral character." Before recommending such
action, INS General Counsel's position was that it was
"essential that there be a specific, documented finding
of fraud in each particular case before a naturalization
application is denied."
Footnote 155.
Although the ODD files had been ordered to be kept in
Las Vegas, they remained available to be reviewed by
INS. In fact, the ODD review team developed an on-site
system for reviewing the files if requests for
information were received under the Freedom of
Information Act.