Published in VDARE.COM -
January 15, 2004
VITAL SIGNS: THE NEW REPUBLIC
The American Myth of World War I
By Joseph E. Fallon
From the January 2004 issue of
Chronicles:
In
1917, two revolutions engulfed war-ravaged
Europe. The first was America’s military
intervention in France on June 26, which prolonged
World War I and, thus, made possible the second:
the
communist seizure of power in Russia on
November 7.
To win
maximum public support for their respective revolutions,
the two rivals, Woodrow Wilson and Vladimir Lenin,
adopted the same tactic. Each declared his forces were
fighting to establish peace,
democracy, and national self-determination in
Europe.
A common
rhetoric concealed a common goal. Despite ideological
differences, Wilson the capitalist and Lenin the Marxist
shared the same ambition—the destruction of the
traditional cultural and social order of Europe. Each
sought to convert World War I into a war against Western
civilization. They differed only on which
ideology—“democratic capitalism” or “democratic
socialism”—would be the foundation for the New World
Order they wished to impose upon Europe.
When Wilson
militarily intervened in that war, he instigated a
revolution against the traditional foreign policy of the
United States. As George Washington emphasized in his
Farewell Address: “The great rule of conduct for
us in regard to foreign nations is—in extending our
commercial relations—to have with them as little
political connection as possible.”
More
prophetic were the words delivered by John Quincy Adams.
In his speech to the
U.S. House of Representatives on July 4, 1821,
celebrating
Independence Day, he warned against going abroad in
search of “monsters to destroy” and foretold the
consequences if the federal government pursued foreign
adventures.
["America] has abstained from interference in the
concerns of others, even when conflict has been for
principles to which she clings, as to the last vital
drop that visits the heart. . . . Wherever the standard
of freedom and independence has been or shall be
unfurled, there will her heart, her benedictions and her
prayers be. But she goes not abroad, in search of
monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the
freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and
vindicator only of her own. . . . She well knows that by
once enlisting under other banners than her own, were
they even the banners of foreign independence, she would
involve herself beyond the power of extrication, in all
the wars of interest and intrigue, of individual
avarice, envy, and ambition, which assume the colors and
usurp the standard of freedom. The fundamental maxims of
her policy would insensibly change from liberty to force
. . . "
Wilson
ignored this warning. His revolution, however, only
succeeded because of two previous events. First, Lincoln
had
shredded the Constitution, turning the United States
from a voluntary union of states into a consolidated
empire for the benefit of Northern business interests.
Second, Theodore Roosevelt had used the Spanish-American
War to expand Lincoln’s continental empire into a
full-fledged imperial regime presiding over a string of
overseas colonies. As William Graham Sumner wrote in
“The Conquest of the United States by Spain,”
“We have beaten Spain in a military conflict, but we are
submitting to be conquered by her on the field of ideas
and policies.”
Mark Twain
aptly labeled this period (roughly 1865-1900), when the
Old Republic was replaced by a permanent kleptocracy
with imperial pretensions,
“The Gilded Age”—hypocritical and corrupt, cruel and
flamboyant. By 1864, Lincoln’s attorney general, Edward
Bates, already
lamented that “The abuse of official powers and
thirst for dishonest gain are now so common that they
cease to shock.” The American Empire created by
Lincoln and Roosevelt had replaced Thomas Jefferson and
Monticello with
Boss Tweed and
Tammany Hall.
American
involvement in World War I, first as a neutral selling
to the Allies and, later, as a belligerent fighting with
the Allies, vindicated the words of John Quincy
Adams—“individual avarice, envy, and ambition . . .
usurp[ed] the standard of freedom.”
In
War Is a Racket, an exposé of profiteering, U.S.
Marine Corp Maj. Gen. Smedley Darlington Butler wrote:
“At least 21,000 new millionaires and billionaires
were made in the United States during the World War.”
Big
businesses—particularly the iron, steel, and munitions
industries—made a killing between 1914 and 1918.
American Sugar Refining Company registered profits of
300 percent; Anaconda Copper, more than 300 percent;
Bethlehem Steel, more than 800 percent; Central Leather
Company, 1,100 percent; DuPont, more than 950 percent;
General Chemical Company, 1,400 percent; International
Nickel Company, 1,700 percent; U.S. Steel, more than 200
percent; and Utah Copper, more than 400 percent.
Other
industries, no matter how irrelevant or incompetent,
also made handsome profits. For example, as General
Butler notes, after entering the war, the U.S.
government spent one billion dollars on airplane engines
that were never used and $635 million on ships made of
wood that sank; purchased 60 million yards of mosquito
netting for American troops in France, hundreds of
thousands of McClellan cavalry saddles for an American
army in France that had no cavalry, 35 million pairs of
hobnailed shoes for four million American soldiers, and,
in the age of the automobile, 6,000 buckboards.
By first
selling the Allies food and such essential war materiel
as rifles, howitzers, and explosives, then extending
them loans when they could no longer pay in cash, the
United States went from a net debtor to a net creditor.
By 1917, the Allies owed approximately $12 billion to
the U.S. government, banks, and manufacturers. Of this
total, the United Kingdom owed four billion dollars;
France, three billion.
The war,
however, was a two-edged sword. If the Allies had
defaulted, which would have occurred if they had been
defeated or if the war had ended in a stalemate, those
same American businesses that had grown rich extending
loans and credits to the Allies would have been ruined.
In 1917, such a defeat or stalemate looked likely, as
mutinies erupted in both the French and Russian armies.
This
fear—that major American businesses were facing
potential bankruptcy which, in turn, could trigger an
economic depression in the United States—coupled with an
increasing messianic belief in himself as creator of a
new European order, persuaded Woodrow Wilson to
intervene militarily in 1917.
Employing a
series of clichés and double standards, Wilson and his
supporters proclaimed American intervention a moral
imperative. It was
“the war to end all wars”—except those in colonial
possessions;
“the world must be made safe for democracy”—except
in India, the Philippines, etc.; all nations had the
right to “self-determination”—except
Austrians, Croats, Germans, Hungarians, Slovaks,
Slovenes, etc.
And, while
declaring America’s intervention would guarantee a peace
based on the principles of “no annexations” and “no
punitive damages,” the Wilson administration annexed the
Danish West Indies, and American businesses that had
extended loans to the Allies backed punitive damages
against Germany.
American
intervention ensured an Allied military victory. But
what exactly did American intervention accomplish?
First, it
needlessly prolonged the war. By the spring of 1917, the
Allied and Central Powers had been bled to death in such
debacles as Jutland, Verdun, and Somme. Both sides were
actively seeking an end to the war. Germany and
Austria-Hungary had already offered several peace
proposals, and ongoing attempts were being made by the
Vatican, Denmark, Sweden, and even individual Americans
to mediate a peace settlement. American intervention
enabled the Allies to reject a negotiated settlement and
to pursue a military victory. This prolonged the war by
nearly two years.
Second, it
needlessly increased the number of casualties and
fatalities. By the time the Armistice was signed on
November 11, 1918, the dead numbered 10 million; the
wounded, another 20 million. More than one million
soldiers were killed between 1917 and 1918. For the
principal belligerents on the Western Front, the
demographic impact was mind-boggling. Eleven percent of
the population of France, nine percent of the population
of Germany, and eight percent of the population of the
United Kingdom had been either killed or wounded.
Despite the
Armistice and knowledge that famine was sweeping across
much of Central and Eastern Europe, the Allies continued
their food blockade of Germany until July 11, 1919, in
order to force the Weimar Republic to sign the
Versailles Peace Treaty. The total number of German
civilian deaths from starvation rose to nearly one
million.
In addition,
1918 and 1919 saw the outbreak of the
influenza epidemic in Europe. Recent historical
research has traced its source to American troops from
Camp Funston, Kansas. It mutated and was spread
around the world by returning soldiers. The influenza
killed 280,000 civilians in the United Kingdom; 400,000
civilians in Germany; 450,000 civilians in the United
States; and more than 20 million civilians worldwide.
Third,
American entry into the war needlessly destroyed the
economic and social order of Europe. Woodrow Wilson, in
his self-appointed role as creator of a new Europe,
demanded institutionalized chaos as the price of peace.
The centuries-old monarchies of Austria, Hungary,
Prussia, and the German states were abolished. The
Austro-Hungarian Empire, which, over the course of
centuries, had prevented a Turkish conquest of Western
Europe and had provided stability in Central Europe, was
dismembered. It was replaced by an assortment of
unstable entities—truncated Austria and Hungary,
multiethnic Poland and Rumania, artificial
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Along with these new
states came the introduction of weak currencies, which
exacerbated the economic collapse of Central and Eastern
Europe. Germany was forced to pay war reparations of $31
billion, plus ten percent of her national income
annually, to cover Allied occupation costs and pre-war
debt. The result was inflation, deflation, economic
dislocation, economic depression, the collapse of the
middle class in Germany, and political instability in
much of Europe.
These were
the consequences of America’s intervention. Stripped of
its political rhetoric, for truth is the first casualty
of war, the reality of America’s intervention was that
patriotism provided the cover for profiteering;
democracy was a euphemism for demagoguery;
self-determination was a pretense for
self-aggrandizement; and the only lasting peace was that
of the dead and dying—of men, nations, and Western
civilization.
The arrival
of American troops in 1917 brought Europe damnation, not
salvation. By funding and then waging a war that
destroyed the traditional social order of Europe, the
United States facilitated the rise of
totalitarianism—Stalin in Russia, Mussolini in Italy,
and Hitler in Germany. Without American intervention in
World War I, there would have been no World War II.
Joseph E.
Fallon writes from Rye, New York.