Immigrant's Book Helping Reshape Immigration Debate
By Vincent Carroll
Rocky Mountain News, June
18, 1995
Peter Brimelow is a two-time
immigrant—first to
Canada from
England and
from Canada to the United States, where he is now a
citizen—who ironically finds himself a leading
figure in the movement to reshape American immigration
policy. In his controversial book Alien Nation,
Brimelow argues that the present policy of admitting
large numbers of immigrants each year—legal and
illegal—threatens to fracture American identity and is
meanwhile doing little good for the economy. He also
contends that immigration is virtually the sole factor
that will boost U.S. population to 390 million by
mid-century.
Brimelow is a senior editor of
Forbes magazine, has written for many other
major publications, and was a
columnist for the London Times.
This interview with Vincent
Carroll, editor of the editorial pages, is one in a
series with prominent authors.
Carroll: Supporters of large
immigration quotas often insist that the level of
immigration into America today is not greater than it
was at other periods of America's history.
Brimelow: That's bunk, and
it arises because people either don't understand or
can't understand, apparently, the statistical concepts
involved. Immigration relative to population is as high
as it has ever been, especially if you take into account
illegal immigration. But the critical issue is not
immigration relative to population size, but population
growth. It happens that in the U.S., Americans of all
races have stabilized their family sizes at or around
replacement level, so the Census Bureau projects the
population will be (absent immigration) around 250-260
million as far as the eye can see. But with immigration
at current levels, it will be driven up to 390 million
by 2050, of whom 130 million will be immigrants and
their descendants.
Which is why, incidentally, this is
an issue that interests environmentalists, because the
great bulk of population growth is captured with
immigration. The government is essentially
second-guessing the people's population desires. The
people in effect want to stabilize population at about
250 million.
Carroll: So a third of the
U.S. population will be post-1970 immigrants or their
descendants by mid-century?
Brimelow: In my book, I call
that portion of the population "The Wedge." Look,
Americans do have a tradition of immigration, but it is
a tradition of intermittent immigration, going back into
colonial periods. There is usually a pause between great
influxes. The two great pauses were after the
Revolution, which lasted nearly 50 years, and in the
middle of this century, which lasted 40 years. Most of
the time these pauses happened by accident. But in the
1920s, Congress did it by legislation, and that's what
is going to have to happen now because of the
demographic structure of the Third World, which is where
the U.S. now draws its immigrants from. It mostly comes
from 15 countries.
Carroll: Explain why that
is. The 1965 Immigration Act was meant to create a level
playing field for immigrants from all countries, so as
not to discriminate.
Brimelow: Which is absurd on
its face because immigration policy is inherently
discriminatory. You've got to make choices. Even if you
have open borders, you are, in effect, discriminating in
favor of people who live next door. Yes, Congress said
it was going to treat all countries in the world
equally, but that's not how it's worked out. In fact, 15
countries are dominating the immigration inflow because
of the principle of "family unification," which
is defined very broadly. Basically, immigrants have the
right to bring more relatives in.
And so the first countries to get
the immigration chains going were able to shoulder aside
the rest. Thus skilled immigrants from many countries
have been shouldered aside for the unskilled who happen
to be related to those already here; the result is a
dramatic deterioration in skill levels among immigrants.
For the first time in American history, immigrants are
less skilled than the native born. At various points in
the 1980s, 45% of the immigrant inflow didn't have high
school degrees. That is an absurd situation for a
country that's competing on the basis of high
technology.
Carroll: But clearly some
immigrants are highly skilled. Author
George Gilder points to the large numbers of
immigrant scientists, engineers and entrepreneurs active
in the Silicon Valley and claims that if "you exclude
immigrants from our high-tech industries, what you get
is Europe, where they have no important computer or
semi-conductor companies after 20 years of focusing on
information technology."
Brimelow: George is just not
looking at the facts. There has been enormous
immigration into
Britain from India. The reason Britain's
high-technology industry is inferior is because of its
suffocating tax system. There are about 30,000
immigrants a year to the U.S. who have Ph.Ds. It's a
very, very small fraction of the inflow.
Carroll: What are we talking
about in terms of total immigrants?
Brimelow: Legal immigration
is just short of a million a year. It's been running
somewhere between 850,000 to 950,000. Illegal
immigration is somewhere over 2 million to 3 million a
year, but most of those go back. In fact, they go back
several times. So it appears that the net illegal
immigration annually is somewhere between
300,000-500,000. That's very high, especially as it is
almost totally unskilled.
Carroll: Your book claims
there are now more illiterate immigrants than there are
immigrants with Ph.Ds.
Brimelow: Yes. If you needed
skilled immigration, you could have it. You could just
simply take the skilled immigrant part of the flow,
which would be very small. So if Gilder were right,
there's no case for bringing in so many unskilled
immigrants. The overlying point is that nobody can look
at the way the system's working now and be satisfied
with it.
Carroll: Some critics of
yours say that if you don't have unskilled immigrants,
you won't have people willing to do unattractive jobs
such as picking lettuce.
Brimelow: The
Japanese seem to manage, don't they? They seem to
harvest their rice. Cheap work is simply not necessary
for a
high-technology economy. The Japanese have
outstripped the Americans since 1955 with
no immigration at all. For that matter, the U.S.
grew faster in the 1950s and '60s than before mass
immigration started again. You know, there is technical
literature on how much immigration helps the American
economy, specifically how much the native born benefit
from it. For some reason, many people just don't bother
to look at it. I think the reason is sheer ignorance,
actually. But the fact is that the technical literature
demonstrates that immigration is just not a very
effective way of increasing the wealth of the native
born, and probably never has been—once you get past a
certain depth and complexity of the economy.
Carroll: You argue that even
great enthusiasts of immigration, like the economist
Julian Simon, acknowledge that immigration probably does
have a
deleterious effect on poor workers, which in this
country means, disproportionately, blacks.
Brimelow: It is something he
will acknowledge when asked. He conveniently skips over
this when he's discussing immigration in debate. But he
never said that immigration does not displace specific
groups. All he says is that, in the aggregate,
immigrants don't only take jobs, they also make jobs.
But the problem is that the people who are displaced are
not necessarily the ones who are going to benefit from
immigration. In fact, one of the things that the work of
George Borjas (a Cuban-born economist at the
University of San Diego) is able to demonstrate is that
although immigration doesn't increase the wealth of the
native born by any significant amount, it does cause a
redistribution of income within the native-born
community. Immigration is a class issue. It benefits the
upper-middle classes insofar as it benefits anybody. And
it punishes the unskilled and the poor. It did in the
19th century, too.
Carroll: Well, there is
little doubt that in cities like Boston in the 19th
century,
Irish immigrants did compete with free blacks for
low-level jobs.
Brimelow: One of the
unappreciated things about the
Know-Nothing Party (which is identified with 19th
century nativism and anti-immigrant sentiment) is that
they were abolitionists; they were against slavery. Many
went on to become prominent Republicans. One of their
objections to the Irish was, specifically, that the
Irish didn't like the blacks. And what's more, they were
right—Irish immigrants didn't like the blacks. Look at
the New York
draft riots.
Carroll: The foundation of
your argument against immigration is not economic so
much as cultural, is it not?
Brimelow: Well, I think that
the most original part of my book is my revisionist look
at economics. Because what it does is show that quite
contrary to all this
anecdotal propaganda we get from places like
Reason magazine (a libertarian publication that opposes immigration
restrictions), you can't make an economic case for
immigration. You have to make a political case.
Carroll: You make a
political case against it. Specifically, you worry about
the political fragmentation of this country. I've always
been somewhat skeptical of this fragmentation argument,
taken literally, since it seems to me that if immigrants
don't assimilate, they won't succeed, and most know it.
Brimelow: Let me say I have
confidence in the American assimilative mechanism. I
think America can probably assimilate
Martians. But it takes time to work. It has always
worked in the past in combination with immigration
pauses. Those pauses are critical to the assimilation
process. And right now a pause will have to be
legislated.
I'm always getting into trouble
because I've written so frankly about
race and immigration. But what I say, although
nobody's bothered to notice, is that a nation is an
interlacing of ethnicity and culture and it's possible
for individuals of any race to assimilate culturally.
But it does take time. The more
different people are and the more
different a culture they come from, the longer it's
going to take.
To address your specific point. The
1990 census picked up two fascinating trends. One is
that immigrants are going into enclaves, and these
enclaves are sort of statewide. So you see this great
concentration, for example, of Asians, many of whom
ultimately finish up in Northern California or in Orange
County (Calif.). Hispanics are in a contiguous area all
the way through the Southwest and West. There are
several counties in southern Texas now that are more
than 99% Hispanic.
The second point the 1990 census
picked up—it was
Bill Frey, a demographer from the University of
Michigan who spotted it—both native races are, to a
discernable extent,
moving out of the impacted areas. Frey calls this
"the flight from diversity." Seventy-five
percent of all legal immigrants end up in six
states—California, Texas, Florida, New Jersey, New York,
Illinois. And the native-born Americans are on the move
away from those states. Whites from California go up to
the Pacific northwest, the Intermountain West and to the
white areas of the South. Blacks go predominantly to the
black areas of the South, the great black metropolises
of
Atlanta and
Washington, D.C., and so on. So the country is
actually polarizing ethnically. And what is going to
result, if this continues, is sectional areas that are
as different as different countries. They're going to be
different racially, and they're probably going to speak
different languages.
Carroll: Stop right there.
Speak different languages? With the exception of
Spanish, what other language could any section possibly
speak? Asian immigrants tend to come from a
variety of nations, after all.
Brimelow: I mainly mean
Spanish, of course, because half of all the immigrants
who have come in since '65 have been Spanish-speaking.
Which, by the way, is completely contrary to what the
1965 law explicitly promised; it promised that no one
country or group or area would dominate the inflow.
Meanwhile, the assimilative
mechanism is being dismantled. When people came in
previous immigration waves, the authorities were
absolutely determined to Americanize them. Theodore
Roosevelt went around making speeches about how there
should be no hyphenated Americanism. Now it's exactly
the reverse. People, parties go around making speeches
about "diversity." Vice President Al Gore made a
speech in which he even got the meaning of "E
Pluribus Unum" wrong. He said it means,
"Out of one, many,"
when of course it means exactly the opposite.
Carroll: One of the more
interesting and serious-minded critiques of your book
has been by the
author Francis Fukuyama. He points out that you
throw around the term "white" awfully loosely in
describing American culture—using "white" as a
synonym, essentially, for European. The dominant
cultural tradition of the United States is much more
specific than that. This nation was founded, as he
writes, by "a sectarian Protestant Anglo-Saxon
culture that was somehow detached from its ethnic roots,
mixed with
universalistic Lockean-liberal principles, and
adopted by the non-Anglo-Saxon, non-Protestant
immigrants" who arrived later. There was a time, he
points out, when the differences between, say, a
southern Italian and an Englishman were perceived to be
of greater magnitude than the difference today between,
say, a Guatemalan and a Midwestern farmer.
Brimelow: The country was
80% white and 20% black at its independence, but no
blacks participated in the political process. It was
also of overwhelmingly British origin to an extent
that's completely forgotten now. If you read the
Founding Fathers, if you read the
Federalist Papers, you see that the reason they
thought they could make a nation was because they
considered themselves people with one language, one
culture, one history, one religion. They didn't mean
Christianity; they were 98% Protestant. So it was a
nation in the European sense. And it remains a nation in
the European sense because all nations in Europe have
assimilated groups. All nations are nations of
immigrants. I know of no case where people have simply
grown out of the ground. The difference is the speed in
which the U.S. has been put together. And the problem is
that it could all be un-put together just as quickly.
Carroll: Here's what I'm
trying to get at. If you're talking about the need to
assimilate immigrants so they adopt, in good part,
American culture, that is one thing. But one should not
then define American culture as "white."
Brimelow: I don't. All
nations are an interlacing of ethnicity and culture.
That's even true with the Japanese. You can trace
separate ethnic groups in Japan. You have to know a
lot about
Japanese ethnology to do it, but you can. Yes,
immigrant groups who came here from Europe in the 19th
century and early 20th were perceived as very different
from those who were already here. That is true. But
objectively, they were not as different as
many current immigrants. The overwhelming majority
of earlier-era immigrants were Christians, for example.
They were obviously of the same race. And, what is often
forgotten, they came at a time when immigrants were
still also arriving in large numbers from nations that
supplied this nation's original stock—northern and
western Europe. That is not the case now. Immigration is
totally non-traditional now. In any event, what happened
was that it took more than 40 years for the last great
wave of immigrants to assimilate—through intermarriage,
for example, which is one good test of assimilation.
Carroll: I understand what
you're saying, but I still find jarring some of your
discussion of the ethnic component of immigration. Let
me put it this way. If one discusses immigration in
terms of a racial cast as opposed to a cultural cast,
then the question of whether one would like to welcome,
say, 200,000 immigrants from Russia as opposed to Korea
is very simple. One prefers them from Russia on the
theory that they will "fit in" better off the
bat. But I, for example, am not so sure I would prefer
200,000 immigrants from Russia as opposed to from Korea
because as I look at the remarkable performance of
Koreans here, I conclude that their habits of hard work,
thrift and so on are precisely those that many of us
wish more Americans had these days.
Brimelow: Of course you're
right, generally speaking. It may be that if we could
choose east Asian immigrants that would be a good idea.
But you should note that the dependency rates—the
welfare rates—you find for some Asian groups are
shockingly high. Nearly 50% for Cambodians and people
from Laos; very high for Vietnamese, too. It's even over
8% for Koreans, and 10.4% for those from China. I would
like to know the reason for that. But that's in part one
reason I'm cautious about Asian immigrants.
Carroll: The spring issue of
City Journal has an article by Heather McDonald
called
Why Koreans Succeed. While it never mentions how
many Koreans in New York City are on welfare, it does
point out how Koreans and Chinese immigrants now
dominate all the elite public high schools in New York
City. It looks to me as if most of them are doing pretty
well.
Brimelow: It is not clear to
me that having immigrant valedictorians is terribly good
for the native born. But if the point is that national
origins absolutely matter, the answer is of course they
do. People differ systematically by national origin, on
average, by an enormous amount. In general, however,
First World immigrants do better than Third World
immigrants, and are less dependent on government. Hmong
refugees, for example, which are a particular group from
Laos, are 70% or 80% on welfare.
Carroll: One hears all the
time from immigration enthusiasts the view that ''if
it weren't for immigration, I wouldn't be here." It
is certainly true in my personal case.
Brimelow: In most cases, the
people who say that don't realize that current policy
would probably have prevented their great-grandparents
from coming here anyway. We do not have open borders in
this country. It's a highly perverse, discriminatory and
paradoxically interventionist immigration law that now
favors a few countries over the rest. Immigration policy
is run by special interests.
Carroll: But even immigrants
who don't do well initially, or who take a long time to
assimilate, eventually have made it in the past. Thomas
Sowell has pointed out, for example, that it took the
Irish and southern Italians a very long time to be
assimilated in the United States. Generations.
Brimelow: That's right. And
so the argument is that Hispanics are assimilating at
that pace. But the question is, why do Americans have to
go through this experience again anyway if it's not
doing them any economic good and if the population is
large enough?
Carroll: OK, so what would
you do about immigration? You say we should end all
illegal immigration. How is that possible?
Brimelow: You need to build
a serious physical barrier—some sort of a fence. There's
only about 250 miles where the border can be crossed.
Most of the rest is impassable deserts and mountains.
There are probably 4.5 million
illegals in the country. They should be thrown out, just
as they were in the 1950s. I mean, the illegal
immigration problem in the '50s was very serious, and
they decided to solve it. The Eisenhower administration
stopped it in about six months.
Legal immigration has to be
curtailed until the numbers have been gotten under
control. I mean net immigration of about 200,000 people,
which roughly equals the number of people who leave. So
if you have 200,000 immigrants coming in each year, that
would be no net immigration. They wouldn't be driving
population growth. You could take care of most hardship
cases and the need for particular skills from that pool.
Carroll: Good heavens. You
are serious about this.
Brimelow: Once the situation
has been gotten under control, then Americans, if they
wanted to, could let immigration resume at much reduced
levels. You could allow immigration to resume with more
emphasis on skills, because only skilled immigrants have
shown to benefit the native born, which is the
fundamental criterion. It may well be that we just have
to recognize that the U.S. frontier is closed.
The worst thing about this is that
we know from experience, the experience of the
turn-of-the-century inflow, that where you have a very
disadvantaged and unskilled group coming in, their
children tend to be unskilled, and their grandchildren.
Borjas estimates that it has taken four generations for
the effects of these differences to merge, for these
people to assimilate economically. So essentially what
we're doing now is degrading our workforce, as a
practical matter, for the next hundred years.